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with Verene's general account of the Phenomenology. To put it bluntly: if Verene is
right about the nature of Absolute Knowledge and of Philosophical Science, then
Hegel is wrong---or else he is a greater ironist than even Bertolt Brecht suspected. Or
perhaps the irony lies in the interpretation itself, which may be just a shade too
ingenious. Is it really necessary to destroy the Phenomenology in order to save it?
DANIEL BREAZEALE

University of Kentucky

Dick Howard. From Marx to Kant. SUNY Series in Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, x985. Pp. xiv + 3oo. Cloth, $39.5 o. Paper, $a4.95.
During the past decade Dick Howard has been arguing that we need a return of "the
political." From Marx to Kant continues this argument, and as the title suggests, its
main thesis is that the work of Kant, not that of Marx and Hegel, formulates a
suitable theoretic platform for expressing this need. But what is meant by "the
political"? In an earlier book, Howard writes: "My frequent use of the concept of 'the
political' has been criticized by friends who find i t . . . too vague. ''1 A similar criticism
can be launched in general against his latest book: crucial terms are seldom sharply
defined and the line of argument is often unclear. Nonetheless, we can discern that
the call for a return of the political is basically a plea for the creation of a public
sphere in which citizens actively exercise their political judgment. Thus what characterizes the political is not power and group interests but the existence of a widespread public debate on moral, social, economic, and political issues. Another essential feature that Howard ascribes to the political is that it is open-ended: normative
claims that emerge within this sphere are continually put into question. One important ramification of this interrogative structure of the political is that it contradicts
the view that history has some definite and final telos.
We may extrapolate from these two aspects of the political two reasons why
Howard holds that we need a return of the political: political decision-making cannot
be left to legislators alone but also requires extensive public debate; and, political
enlightenment is a continuous and dialogical learning process. From this perspective
it is not surprising that he rejects the work of Marx and Hegel as inadequately
expressing the need for a return of the political. He argues, for example, that Marx
offered a flawed economic substitute for the political by claiming that the developmental logic of capital would transform the proletariat from a universal class "in
itself" to a universal class "for itself" (i.e., as conscious of its historical mission).
Reproduction of capitalist ideology is seen as one negative result of this reductionistic

1. The Marxian Legacy (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), xii. In my description of Howard's
concept of the political I have also used his "The Politics of Modernism: From Marx to Kant,"
Philosophy & Social Criticism 8:4 (Winter a981 ).
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schema o f political enlightenment from without; another is repression by the Leninist
vanguard party. Additionally, H o w a r d repudiates, of course, Marx's contention that
communism solves the "riddle o f history." He is equally critical of Kant's ethics,
e x p o u n d i n g the (all-too) familiar thesis that this ethics is centered a r o u n d a formal
monological subject--the good will. His alternative is a political reconstruction of
Critique of Judgment. T h e esthetic j u d g m e n t as a reflective j u d g m e n t can function as a
model for political j u d g m e n t . H o w a r d argues that political j u d g m e n t in this form
expresses the theoretical possibility o f and need for a return of the political: "The
discursive process by which reflective j u d g m e n t establishes validity claims moves beyond the formal monological subject. Reflective j u d g m e n t obeys the imperative to
'think in the place o f the other'. It implies the existence o f a common, and ultimately
a communal, sense that permits this interchange" (65). In other words, the existence
o f "common sense" makes possible that political decision-making is rooted in general
public debate, whereas the maxims o f this common sense signify that adequate political will-formation can only be reached through such a debate. From Marx to Kant
concludes that Perpetual Peace puts flesh on these bare bones. Howard's interpretation o f the right to universal hospitality may serve here as an example: "The 'law of
hospitality' d e m a n d s that the particular states interact explicitly. T h e y must communicate, exchange, learn to think in the place of the other. Isolationism would fix their
content like a contract that shuts off further enlightenment" (267).
Howard's project is incomplete in at least three respects. First, his book leaves the
question open whether the Kantian republic as an instance of the political is consistent with a capitalist economy. This is unsatisfactory, not only in light of Kant's own
view on this question but also because it obscures the reason for Howard's concern
with Marx in the first place. Second, the book does not provide a detailed discussion
of various problems that arise from making the j u d g m e n t of taste the model for
political j u d g m e n t ? T h i r d , it leaves us with an unresolved tension in Kant's work
between a "closed" monological ethics and an o p e n - e n d e d dialogical politics.~ T h e
viability o f Howard's project d e p e n d s on whether it can successfully come to terms
with these three issues.
HARRY VAN DER LINDEN

Colgate University

~. Such a discussion can be found in Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1983). Beiner and Howard share a common view of the political.
Their political reconstruction of Critique of Judgment is based on Hannah Arendt's earlier attempt in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982 ).
The other major influence on Howard's Kant interpretation is the work ofJi~rgen Habermas.
3- One solution to this problem is to reconstruct Kant's ethics as dialogical and as formulating an open-ended historical ideal--the moral society of colegislators. The neo-Kantian
Hermann Cohen developed this line in Ethik des reinen Willens. Howard, however, dismisses
the Marburg School (283n.), wrongly holding that his marginal criticism of Karl Vorllinder
implies a rebuttal of Cohen as well.

